Introduction
Trade theory does not require that cross-border trade ows be balanced period by period. Large current account and trade imbalances, however, are typically observed with concern. Concerns arise, because global imbalances can result in disruptive and potentially painful adjustments. 1 Distinguishing between harmful imbalances that entail the danger of costly disruptions and natural imbalances that arise under optimal international borrowing and lending is of obvious relevance for policy makers. This paper documents one particular source of natural imbalances that previous literature has ignored. It shows how unbalanced trade arises when a sector, which is characterized by cost-and time-intensive R&D activity and exhibits rapid (e.g., demand-driven) growth. Countries with a comparative advantage in this specic sector will, (anticipating demand growth) intensify according R&D activity. Part of the R&D investments are nanced on the international capital market, thereby generating capital inows to the mentioned countries, which consequently run trade decits in these R&D periods. Conversely, there are capital outows in later periods, mirrored by the corresponding trade surpluses.
The theory is framed in the classical two-country model of trade in varietiesà la Krugman (1980) , which is amended in two dimensions. First, countries trade in two periods, which allows for non-trivial international borrowing and lending. Second, varieties are produced in two different sectors under costly entry for an unlimited pool of identical entrants. The two sectors differ in the nature of setup costs: in one of them, the sector , setup costs accrue up front; the other sector exhibits standard per-period xed costs. Consequently, rms in sector  are set up in the initial period but produce in the second period, whereas the other rms are set up and produce in each of the periods. I assume that only country 1 can produce in sector  and that it therefore covers world demand. In the rst period, country 1 thus allocates part of its resources to cover setup costs in sector . International capital markets channel savings to foreign investors to country 1's -sector to (partly) cover up-front setup costs. Thus, capital ows to country 1 and its position of net foreign assets decreases as it runs a trade decit. In the second period, the rms in sector  produce; prots are used 3 to service returns on investment and country 1 runs a trade surplus.
It is worth stressing that growth of the R&D-intensive sector, which is required for the mechanism to operate, does not necessarily generate differences in GDP growth across countries. Hence, the theory is not merely a variation of the well-studied effect by which cross-country differentials in income growth generate global imbalances (see Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996) . Instead, it shows that sector-specic technological progress in one country can generate imbalances without any cross-country growth differentials. The underlying reason for this observation is that shifts in factor allocation and countries' specialization patterns transmit the gains from sector-specic productivity growth in one country across borders, thereby levelling growth across countries. 2 The model shows that such intertemporally optimal imbalances would be classied as harmful under an conventional assessment based on cross-country growth (and savings) rates. As a corollary, the argument also shows that distinguishing natural and harmful imbalances may be even tougher than previously thought. 3 In addition, the model delivers valuable insights related to exchange rate dynamics. Specically, it predicts that a country's trade surplus may coincide with an appreciation of its real exchange rate (dened as the ratio of local over foreign consumer-price adjusted wages). The real exchange rate of a country with a growing R&D-intensive sector, as described above, appreciates over time through a combination of the two following antagonistic forces. First, wages in such a country tend to fall relative to foreign wages because of the capital outows in the second period. 4 Second, wages tend to increase by the home market effect as physical production expands in the second period. These effects make the local price index fall, thereby increasing real wages. These second forces turn out to be dominant, and the real exchange rate of the country appreciates. In sum, exchange rate appreciations concur with positive net exports.
Finally, it seems important to stress that the theory crucially rests on the assumption that the R&D-intensive sector exhibits a period of accelerated growth. This growth may be driven by either technological progress (the 4 costs of R&D drops and suddenly becomes protable), or it may result from an increase in the demand for the R&D-intensive goods (demographic change or per capita income growth change expenditure patterns). In either scenario, the economy is not in steady state, and there is not a constant stream of capital outow that is balanced by a constant stream of capital inows.
To illustrate the theory with a real-world example, the model is calibrated to Switzerland's trade ows of the past two decades. The Swiss economy is particularly well-suited to illustrate the theoretical mechanism because it satises the key preconditions: large shares of its export basket consist of pharmaceutical goods. The pharmaceutical sector, in turn, has experienced a period of accelerated demand growth in the recent past and is, moreover, R&D intensive. Indeed, the pharmaceutical industry is the paradigm of an R&D-intensive sector, with a R&D phase that is not only cost-intensive but that extends over particularly long periods of time. 5 In combination, these features make the pharmaceutical sector in general and the Swiss economy in particular a tting example of the situation described in the theoretical setup.
Calibrated to match the increase of the share of pharmaceutical products in the Swiss export basket, the model performs well in predicting the increase of total trade under a wide range of reasonable parameter values. At the same time, the terms of trade (domestic over foreign wages) and the real exchange rate (price adjusted wage ratio) are predicted to remain essentially unchanged. Finally, these key results -moderate changes of the terms of trade and real exchange rates at simultaneously large movements in the trade balance -generalize to the case when the country considered is relatively large.
The present paper connects to various bodies of literature. First, it relates to the extensive work on the global imbalances and external adjustments, and thus to the classical contribution by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) , who highlight how the forces of consumption smoothing generate global borrowing and lending. A large portion of recent studies are motivated by the US current account decit (which constitutes the largest share of global imbalances). 6 The key culprits are typically found in the strong reserve accumulation of Asian (particularly Chinese) central banks and in 5 See Klette (1996) , Acemoglu and Linn (2004) and Deutsche Bank (2012) . 6 See Edwards (2005) , Rogoff (2005a, 2007) Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2014) , Corsetti and Konstantinou (2012) and Blanchard et al (2005) . 4 5 US scal policy, which are sometimes regarded as the major contributors of the recent nancial crisis. 7 Most studies argue that for ultimate rebalancing, substantial depreciations of the USD is needed. Reviewing this literature, Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) generally distinguish between the category of harmful imbalances, which are typically attributed to the realm of policy misalignments and systemic risks and are benecial, or good imbalances, which arise, e.g., due to differentials in economic growth rates, demographic dynamics and other factors that affect national savings and investment opportunities. Recent prominent examples of the latter are Caballero et al (2008) and Mendoza et al (2009) . Other prominent explanations rely on the global savings glut, valuation effects or nancial development. 8 The current paper adds to this literature by highlighting one specic source of good imbalances. Specically, it stresses that cross-country differences in aggregate growth rates are generally not enough to detect the sources of good imbalances when these are based on sector-specic growth.
The current study also contributes to the analysis of global imbalances through the lens of trade-based models such as those of Dekle et al (2007) and (2008) and Corsetti et al (2007 and . 9 These studies typically build on static trade models and examine the implications and channels of eliminating current account imbalances, but they remain silent about the underlying causes of the latter. 10 The current paper adds to this literature in two dimensions. First, it abandons the static modelling setup that is usually explored and thus allows for the endogenous motives of cross-border capital ows and unbalanced trade. 11 Second, it unbundles the sectorial dimension and identies sectoral growth in specic industries as one particular source of global imbalances. It thus takes on the challenge of Dekle et al (2007) , who, observing that trade imbalances remain imperfectly understood, "defer modeling their determinants for future work."
The current paper also relates to the literature on the cyclicality of trade 7 See, in particular, Chinn and Ito (2008) and Roubini and Sester (2005) . 9 See also Boyd et al (2001), Kappler et al (2013) and Chinn and Wei (2013) for discussions on exchange rates and current account adjustments, which go back to Ohlin (1929) and Keynes (1929) .
10 Under such an approach, the effects in the short and the long run are usually distinguished by considering either perfect or no factor mobility (Dekle et al (2008) ), or, alternatively, either exogenous or endogenous number of rms (Corsetti et al (2007) ).
11 In an extension, Corsetti et al (2013) present one of the rare exceptions to the static setup.
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6 ows, which received much attention during the recent trade collapse (as in Alessandria et al. (2010) Domit and Shakir (2010) , Crowley and Luo (2011), Engel and Wang (2011) and Bems et al. (2012) . Closely related to the current paper, Erceg et al. (2008) argue that investment shocks may generate external adjustments and show that these adjustments do not need to come about with real exchange rate uctuations. Regarding framework and analytical tools, the present paper is closest to Corsetti et al (2007 Corsetti et al ( , 2013 , who analyze enhanced versions of the Krugman (1980) type of model. Although these authors explore the effects of rm entry in tradable and non-tradable sectors under largely exogenous adjustments, the present paper goes one step further by endogenizing trade imbalances under crosscountry differentials in investment opportunities.
Lastly, the general principle of the paper is also reminiscent of the hysteresis or beachhead effect (see Baldwin (1988) , Dixit (1989) Baldwin and Krugman (1986) , by which sunk costs that are incurred in the past partly decouple the trade ows from actual exchange rate uctuation. Referring to this phenomenon, Baldwin and Krugman (1986) argue that, " [o] nce foreign rms have invested in marketing, R&D, reputation, distribution networks, etc., they will nd it protable to remain in the U. S. market even at a lower exchange rate."
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theory, section 3 illustrates a calibration exercise to the Swiss economy and, in particular, to its pharmaceutical sector, and section 4 concludes.
The Model
There are two countries, indexed by  = 1 2, and populated with identical individuals. The world economy deviates from the standard Krugman (1980) setup in two dimensions. First, countries produce and trade in two periods, indexed by  = 0 1. The main implication of this assumption is that trade is balanced on an intertemporal basis but not necessarily period-by-period. Second, there are two sectors, indexed by  =  . One of the sectors (sector ) is subject to the standard period-by-period xed costs; in the other (sector ) setup costs need to be incurred one period in advance of physical production.
Model Setup
Preferences. The representative consumer in country  derives a sub-utility from consumption of varieties produced by rm  in sector  (  ) and consumption of varieties produced by rm  0 in sector  (  ). The according sub-utility is
and total utility is
where  is the discount factor of individuals. Denoting wages with   , consumers maximize utility (2) subject to the budget constraints
where    is the consumer price of variety  of sector  produced in country , charged at time ;  is the gross nominal interest rate between both periods.
Technology. The amount   of sector -variety  is produced through
in Home and Foreign. I assume that only country 1 can produce varieties of sector  according to
That is, in the -sector xed costs are incurred in the period before actual production. In  = 0 no rms are active in the -sector and no -type varieties can be produced. 12
12 Notice that this setup admits interpretations of growth in the -sector due to technological change (e.g., when   drops from prohibitive levels in periods   0) or demand shocks (when a weighting factor in the aggregator (1) increases from zero in periods   0 to one as specied here).
Optimization
Product Prices. Factory-gate prices of varieties produced in country  are
as usual under constant elasticities. They are, in particular, equal in both sectors. Cross-border trade is subject to standard iceberg-type trade costs, captured by  ≥ 1, so that local consumer prices equal    and abroad, consumer prices equal    times the factor  .
Country Bundles. By (6), producer prices in both sectors are identical within a period,    =    =   , so that the ideal producer price index of goods produced in country  at time  is
where    is the set of varieties of sector  produced in country  at time  and   is the total mass of varieties (of both sectors) produced in country  at time . Consumer prices of the corresponding consumption bundles   are equal to these prices (7) times gross trade costs  , if applicable. The consumption bundle of individuals in country  of goods produced in country  at time  can be written as
This expression uses that, as prices (6) equalize across sectors, individual consumption does as well ( 2 =  2 ). Finally, aggregate consumption  from (1) is
Expenditures. Consumer decision involves intertemporal expenditure. Preferences (2) imply that expenditure shares in period  is   (1 + ). In period  = 0 the net present value of an individual's income is   =  0 +  −1  1 , where  is the gross nominal interest rate. Thus, expenditures of individuals are, when expressed in period 1-dollars
where relative wages
are introduced.
Demand for Bundles. Consumer optimization of (2) under (9) subject to the budget constraint
Expenditure on consumption goods in country  at time  is now with (7) (see Appendix)
Notice that combining (7), (10) and (13) determines consumption of the bundles   as a function of relative wages Ω and   , and the number of rms   . Determining these latter endogenous variables is the aim of the next steps.
Savings and Capital Flows. In period  = 0, individual savings in either country equals wage income minus expenditure ( 0 = ( 0 −  0 )) or with (10)
Because investment in the -sector is the only form of savings, all savings in country 2 ( 20 =  2  20 ) are invested in country 1. In period  = 1, returns on investments are collected, and country 1's capital outow is  20 . Together, country 1's net capital inows in period  are thus with (14)
Investment in the -Sector. Denote the number of active -type rms in country 1 in period 1 with   so that the total costs of generating 9 blueprints in the -sector is      10 . 13 This sum must be equal the total value of savings in period 0, which is (use  0 =    0 and (14))
where  =  2  1 . Together, this yields
The obvious conditions for an interior solution to prevail are    0 and, by the resource constraint,
At the rm level, free entry in the -sector requires that the entry costs ( 10   ) be just covered by the present value of future operating prots. The CES aggregator (1) implies that the share of operating prots in rm revenue equals 1: This, in turn, implies that the present value of future prots equals  −1 (1)  11  11 . Equating costs to prots and using (11) implies
In  = 1, rm output for the -and for the -sector rm is identical (  11 =   11 ), and, moreover,   11  11 =    11 holds by free entry in the -sector. Thus, the equality
follows. Clearly, in the cases where Ω      , investment costs are not covered, and the -sector is idle. 14 Alternatively, Ω      cannot be an equilibrium, because more -type rms would enter the market. Equation (19) conveniently pins down the wage evolution in country 1 by requiring Ω =  11  10 =     . The crucial observation is that in the interior solution in period 1, a worker (or entrepreneur) is indifferent between buying a blueprint of the -good at the production cost plus interest  10   or paying a worker (or inventor) to set up a -rm at cost  11   .
13 The number of -type rms in country 2 or in period  = 0 is zero by construction. 14 That case occurs if   is too large to justify investment. It can be excluded, however, when   is small enough.
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Equilibrium
The Trade Balance. In period  the value of country 1's net exports is
) or, with (10) and (13)
Trade must be balanced on an intertemporal basis, which implies
A convenient observation is that country 1's trade surplus must correspond to the capital outows  1 = − 1 from (15), or
Because Ω is determined by (19), this system of equations determines relative wages   as a function of model parameters and the number of rms   . These variables will be determined next.
The Number of Firms. Consider rst the number of rms in country 2. Recall that a rm's operating prots as share of revenues equals 1. Because operating prots just cover a rm's xed costs  1   in country 2 on a period-by-period basis, a rm's revenue must be  1   within each period . The total revenues of all -sector rms in country 2 and period  are thus       . This expression must be equal to the aggregate wagebill,  2  2 , so that
Computing the number of active rms in country 1 is more complicated because entry in the -sector is based not on period-by-period prots but on the net present value of operating prots. I will restrict the analysis of equilibria with interior solutions, i.e., in which -varieties will be produced in country 1 in both periods. The relevant conditions will be formulated below.
Letting   1 the amount of labor employed in the -sector, the same argument as above implies
of labor are devoted to invention of blueprints in the -sector in country 1, labor market clearing implies
Now observe that a -rm's labor demand for production excluding setup costs equals its total labor demand   minus employment for setup costs   . In period  = 1, a rm's employment for production is thus ( − 1)  . This statement holds not only for -rms but also for -rms, because marginal costs and demand are the same across sectors. Hence, labor market clearing in  = 1 implies
The two preceding equations can be rewritten as
where   is newly introduced as the total number of rms in country . Note that setting up   -type rms in period  = 0 is equivalent to subtracting     units of labor from the labor force in period 0 and adding     labor units in period 1. Using (19) and (23), the two equations above imply
Equations (17), (23), (24) and (25) determine the number of rms as a function of relative wages and thus close the model.
With (17), (19) and (23), equations (24) and (25) are
With these expressions, the system of two equations (21) and (22) can be written in terms of parameters and the two remaining endogenous variables,   . The resulting system determines   , which then pins down  1 through (23), (26) and (27); all other endogenous variables follow.
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Economic Aggregates
Note that in all equations above the variables Ω and  appear only in combination, i.e., as the fraction Ω. The reason is that in the absence of nominal rigidities, the nominal interest rate is undetermined as long as the level of prices (or wages) are not xed for all periods. Formally, it is therefore safe to set  = 1. With this normalization, key economic aggregates can be computed in the following.
Output. Country 1's share of world GDP in period  is
Exports. Its export shares are with (10) and (13)
The size of the -sector in period 1 is, when measured in sales, with (17) and (25)
Real Exchange Rate. I follow the convention that the real exchange rate, RER, is dened as the relative price of consumption across border (see Corsetti et al 2013) : For country 1, the real exchange rate is thus
These economic indicators will be highlighted in the calibration exercise below.
Calibration of the Model
In this section, I present a calibration exercise of the model developed so far.
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The choice Switzerland's pharma exports
The model developed in the previous section is calibrated to the Swiss economy and its trade ows. The reason why Switzerland is a good example for the mechanism outlined in the theory is its strong comparative advantage in the pharmaceutical sector. This comparative advantage is documented by the fact that Swiss exports of pharmaceutical products exceed imports by a factor of approximately 3. Figure 1 below shows that, since the 1990s the levels of Swiss pharmaceutical imports and exports, measured as a share of Swiss GDP, increased continuously and in parallel. 15 Throughout this period the ratio of exports and imports was roughly stable. The remarkable increase in the importance of trade in pharmaceutical products for the Swiss economy, illustrated in Figure 1 , also impacted the composition of Swiss exports. Thus, Figure 2 shows that pharmaceutical exports as a share of total exports (red line) has grown to constitute a dominant item of the Swiss export basket in recent years. In 2013, for example, Switzerland's pharmaceutical exports accounted for a share of 276 percent of total Swiss exports (USD 624 billion out of a total of USD 2257 billion). Over the ve years from 2009 to 2013, pharmaceutical products accounted for 260 percent of all Swiss exports. The gure also plots the pharmaceutical export share for the rest of the world (blue line). While for Switzerland, this share increased by a factor of four between 1990 (68%) and 2013 (276%), the corresponding increase for the rest of the world was only slightly less pronounced, from 11 to 28 percent (i.e., by a factor of 26). Overall, the growth rates of pharmaceutical shares of Swiss trade and global trade was remarkably similar. Figures 1 and 2 document a rapid increase in global trade of pharmaceutical products, which affected Switzerland's exports in particular due to the country's comparative advantage in the pharmaceutical sector. The impressive growth is likely to relate to demand factors. The World Bank reports that health expenditure in the three largest markets grew at an annual rate of 5.6% in the USA, 4.7% in the European Union and 4.1% in Japan between 1996 and 2012; these growth rates are far above the respective growth rates of per capita GDP during the same period (3.7%, 3.6% and 1.5%). Large parts of this growth were likely driven by per capita income and aging societies. Corresponding to the increase in global expenditure shares, trade volumes in pharmaceutical products have increased dramatically over the last few decades.
The sum of these observations makes Switzerland a paradigm of the theory developed above. Specically, it shows that Switzerland has a strong 16 comparative advantage is the pharmaceutical sector, wich is characterized by the two key characteristics of the model's -sector.
Firstly, the pharmaceutical sector has shown impressive growth over recent years and decades -for Switzerland but also globally. Secondly, the production of pharmaceutical products is subject to large, up-front R&D costs. R&D costs for a new drug or compound range between USD 1 and 2 billion according to recent estimates 16 and total R&D costs amount to up to a third of production costs and make the pharmaceutical industry one of the most prominent example of R&D intensive industry. 17 Moreover, the largest part of these costs accrue at early stages of basic research and in extensive clinical tests, i.e., substantially before the respective drug actually reaches the markets. 18 In sum, R&D costs are exceptionally large and accrue long before operating prots accrue.
These observations make Switzerland a tting example of country 1 of the theory: it has a comparative advantage in the pharmaceutical sector, which is characterized (i) by rapid demand growth and (ii) by large up-front R&D costs. 19
Parametrization
The choice of periods
Before turning to the actual choice of the explicit model parameters, I need to specify which years correspond to the periods of the two-period model of Section 2. Specically, the R&D and the production stage must be determined. Figure 1 above shows that, starting from 1990, there has been a gradual increase in the value of Swiss pharmaceutical exports as a share of GDP. Splitting the time line into an R&D phase and a period of physical production, which, respectively, correspond to period 1 and 2 in the model, is a non-obvious task. Clearly, mapping the stylized framework above to the data may be subject to judgemental errors.
For the sake of transparency, I base the choice of periods on two simple and intuitive criteria. The rst criterion will determine the length of the 17 See, e.g., Cohen and Klepper (1992) and Acemoglu et al (2004) .
18 See DiMasi et al (2003) and Deutsche Bank (2012) , discussed below in more detail.
19 See also Sauré (2015) for more information about Swiss trade and Switzerland's pharmaceutical sector.
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periods. This length is equalized to the length of the pharmaceutical R&D process, which is taken from the literature. Second, the starting point and the ending point of the second period are determined by the largest increase in the Switzerland's export share of pharmaceuticals.
Regarding the rst criterion, the R&D phase decomposes into one of basic research (drug discovery and pre-clinical tests) and one of clinical trials. The latter phase is reported to stretch over six or seven years. (DiMasi et al (2003) compute it to extend to 721 month, Deutsche Bank (2012) The second criterion will x the starting point and the ending point of the two 10-year periods on the time line. Specically, I impose that the second period is dened through the largest increase of Swiss pharmaceutical 18 exports. The maximum increase in Switzerland's pharmaceutical exports, measured as a share of GDP, occurred at the end of the time-window, i.e. between the 10-year period of 1994-2003 and the period 2004-2013, when it increased by 439 percent from 377 to 817. 21 Figure 3 presents investment and prots of Switzerland's two largest pharmaceutical rms. 22 The gure corroborates that the dened periods qualitatively correspond to the assumptions of the model. Specically, the share of operating prots (or operating income, left panel) of both rms combined grew by 62 percent (from 169 to 231 percent). By comparison, the share of R&D and other investments (right panel) grew only moderately by 33 percent (from 190 to 223 percent). 23 These numbers suggest that the later period, 2004-2013, corresponds to a period, in which the gains from previous investments are reaped.
Lastly, to show that the R&D expenditure in the pharmaceutical sector matters for Switzerland's economic aggregates, Figure 4 plots the R&D investments of the two Swiss pharmaceutical rms in percent of Swiss GDP (black line). 24 This share is slightly trending upwards, reecting the growing importance of the pharmaceutical sector for the Swiss economy, and averages around 22 percent over the period 1994 to 2013.
The red line indicates Switzerland's trade balance of goods, showing that both variables, pharmaceutical investments and the trade balance are of the same order of magnitude. 25 In accordance with the theory, the trade balance is negative in the rst part of the time window (−049) and positive in the second half (+178). Notice that the two-period model predicts that pharmaceutical investment and R&D activity drops to zero in the second period, which is not the case in reality. Recall, however, that pharmaceutical 21 Between the periods 1993-2002 and 2003-2012 , that share increased by 431 percent and by less in all preceeding, 10-year period sequences. Between 1984 Between -1993 Between and 1994 Between -2003 it increased by only 198 percent.
22 For Novartis, which was founded in 1996 through a merger of Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz, available data go back as far as 1993 but are not compiled for the time before then.
23 The left panel plots operating income (dened as the difference between sales and total operating expenses) as a fraction of net sales or revenues (dened as gross sales and other operating revenue less discounts, returns and allowances). The right panel plots R&D expenses (all direct and indirect costs related to the creation and development of new processes, techniques, applications and products with commercial possibilities) plus capital expenditure (all direct and indirect costs related to the creation and development of new processes, techniques, applications and products with commercial possibilities) as a fraction of net sales or revenues.
24 Recall that part of the pharmaceutical investment may be attributable to locations outside of Switzerland.
25 Trade in goods is measured according to BPM5 accounting standards.
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R&D activity clearly drops relative to pharmaceutical operating prots, as indicated by Figure 3 above. In that sense, and in accordance with the theory, R&D investment dominates in the early period (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) , whereas prots dominate in the second period ( Finally, the gure also plots the Swiss current account (CA -dashed blue line), which is larger than expenditure on pharmaceutical R&D by a factor of approximately four. Note that unlike what the theory predicts, the Swiss CA was in surplus for the entire period. This is a rather common feature of nancial centers (see Lee at al 2008) , and Switzerland's current account surplus is to large extent driven by very volatile income on outbound FDI; thus, its dynamics should not be unduly related to the activities in the pharmaceutical sector specically.
The choice of parameters
The next step consists of the actual choice of the vector of model parameters (         ). For the baseline specication, I set  = 185, corresponding to the estimates for the Swiss economy presented in Auer and 20 Sauré (2011) . 27 The overall iceberg cost to 20% ( = 12) in the benchmark specication. 28 The relative size of the two countries is chosen so that the -exporting country (Switzerland) is roughly 087 percent of the world economy ( = 114). 29 Without loss of generality, the setup costs in the -sector is normalized to unity (  = 1). 30 The setup costs in the -sector (  = Ω  = Ω) is calibrated so that the export basket of the -exporting country equals 102 percent in period  = 1, reecting the increase in the share of Swiss pharmaceutical exports between the two periods 1994-2003 and 2004-2013 (231−129) . The discount factor is set to  = 0599, thus applying a yearly discount factor of   = 095 to a time horizon of a decade. This assumption corresponds to assuming a ten-year period of R&D, followed by a ten year period of effective patent protection. I also consider alternative setups with combinations of  = 5 (as suggested by trade models)  = 174 (as suggested by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) ) and  = 104 (reecting a 20-year period of effective patent protection, where
Calibration Results
As motivated above, the parameter Ω will be used to calibrate the model to generate an increase in country 1's export share of 102 percent in the baseline specication. The variables of interest from the calibration exercise are
• ∆ -the change in country 1's wage relative that of country 2, which coincides with the standard denition of the (change in) terms of trade. Additionally, because GDP is equal to the total wage bill, this number also reects the differential in growth rates.
27 Auer and Sauré (2011) estimate the exchange rate elasticity of Swiss exports, measured in values, to be −085. Hence, the elasticity of quantities, dened in the model as , satises −85 = − *  ln() = −1 −  *  ln() = −1 − . This specication is on the lower end of the range of elasticities usually adopted (see, e.g., Corsetti et al 2013) ; I therefore also experiment with higher values.
28 Although specic subcomponents of trade costs have been estimated based on Swiss data (e.g., Egger and Lassmann 2015 and Kropf and Sauré 2014) , no estimate of overall trade costs exists.
29 According to the World Development Indicators, the Swiss GDP was at 650 billion US$ in 2013, and the World output was at 74 910 billion US$.
30 This normalization impacts the equilibrium mass of active rms but none of the other variables.
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• ∆ 1 -the change in country 1's real exchange rate between period 0 and period 1, dened as the (change in) price-adjusted relative wages.
•  1 =  1 -the GDP-normalized net exports or capital outows of country 1 in period .
The calibration results of the various specications are displayed in Table  1 , with the baseline specication in the rst column and data in the last two columns. An initial observation is in order before turning to the endogenous variables: the parameter Ω is always smaller than  (as required by condition (18)) but very close to . In particular, Ω never falls short of  by more than 1/8 of a percent. The reason for this fact lies in the size of country 1 (i.e., Switzerland). Because, in this model, country 1 supplies the world demand of the -type good in period  = 1, it will completely specialize in -production whenever the -technology allows for an efficient production of -goods (i.e., if Ω =     is very small). However, because the targeted share of -type goods in period  = 1 is smaller than unity, this condition imposes a rather strict lower bound of the choice of parameter Ω.
1994-2003
1994
to to 2004-2013 2013 Ω /δ -1 Note: the equations deteriming the equilibrium are (21), (22), (26) and (27). In all specifications, λ =114 according to the Swiss economic size and α
. Ω is chosen so that the share of D-exports is 10.2 in period t=1.
Endogenous Variables [%]
Model Data δ =0.599 δ =1.045
The rst variable of interest, the countries' relative wages (or terms of trade), shows virtually no reaction to trade ows, the expansion of country 1's exports between period 0 and period 1. This result may appear natural 21 22 under very small trade costs. Indeed, it can be shown that the equilibrium relative wages are unity (  = 1) under zero trade costs ( = 1). 31 However, the result also holds under sizable trade costs ( = 174). The following two forces that affect the wages almost cancel out. First, country 1's relative wage tends to fall because the capital outows, through which foreign investors collect the interest on their investments, generate a depreciation of the terms of trade. This effect was labeled by Keynes the secondary burden of international transfers (see Corsetti et al 2013) . Second, there is the home market effect, which implies that the growth of tradable goods between the rst and the second period generates an appreciation of country 1's terms of trade, which counteracts the secondary burden. It turns out that both effects almost cancel out so that the change in relative wages is negligible. (It is worth noting, however, that for small  and for large  this statement no longer holds.)
Second, country 1's real exchange rate appreciates, but rather moderately so -by approximately one quarter of a percent in the set of eight specications. These effects are due to the expansion in the set of varieties produced in country 1 in combination with the trade costs that drive a wedge between the local prices and the foreign prices. Accordingly, the effect on the  is larger when trade costs are higher (a standard feature of Krugman's (1980) new trade model).
The rst calibration result is a strong persistence of the terms of trade (real exchange rate adjusted wage ratios) and the real exchange rate. These results do not match the rather large changes in both of these variables, reported in the last two columns of Table 1 . 32 However, this discrepancy should not be interpreted as a failure of the model. Indeed, for a small open economy with a large nancial sector, the real exchange rate can be expected to be driven or predicted not by trade volumes but by international capital ows, which are not directly related to export and import ows. 33 Instead, the calibration shows that the changes in trade ows contributed very little (if at all) to the recent appreciation of the Swiss franc and to the 31 See Appendix. 32 The change of relative wage ratio reported in Table 1 is computed based on Swiss and the German real wage indices, expressed in one common currency. Data sources are the Swiss Bundesamt für Statistik and the IFS. The change in the RER is based on the Swiss real exchange rate, narrow denition, as reported by the BIS.
33 This statement is particularly obvious in the period of the nancial crisis, when nan-cial ows to heaven currencies and the unwinding of carry trades appeared to be dominant effects shaping the valuation of the Swiss currency (see, e.g., IMF 2013 and 2014). Accordingly, strong (real and nominal) appreciations of the Swiss franc have occurred since 2007.
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23 improvement of Switzerland's terms of trade.
The third and nal variable of interest is the net export share. It turns out that the average net exports of the periods 1994−2003 were positive. Instead of looking levels, I therefore focus on the increase of GDP-normalized net exports (265 percent of GDP in the data; see last two rows in the penultimate column of Table 1 ) as a metric to assess the performance and success of the model. In the baseline model, reported in the rst column of the table, this increase is over-predicted by a factor of roughly 3. When the elasticity of substitution is changed from  = 185 to  = 5 (as typically specied in calibrations of trade models), the increase in net exports (202 − (−117) = 32 percent of GDP) is well matched (second column), exceeding the increase in the data by as much as 20%. These numbers remain almost unchanged, when assuming relatively high ad valorem trade costs of 74 percent. 
Endogenous Variables [%]
Note: the equations deteriming the equilibrium are (21), (22), (26) and (27) . In all specifications, λ=5
and α
. Ω is chosen so that the share of D-exports is 10.2 in period t=1. Additionally, one may compare the value of export predicted by the calibration to the net exports of the ending point of the ten-year periods considered, i.e., to the values in 1993 and 2013. The according data are reported in the last column of the table. The according increase in the data 24 is 629 percent of GDP, a number that the calibrated model underpredicts by 49 percent (at (   ) = (0599 174 5)) or overpredicts by 64 percent (at (  ) = (1045 12 2) ).
Overall, however, it seems that the calibration to reasonable parameters tends to overpredict the increase in Switzerland's net exports. A reason for this discrepancy might be the real appreciations of the Swiss currency (driven, as argued above, by independent nancial ows). These parts of the appreciations, exogenous to the trade dynamics, might have dampened the increase in the Swiss net exports.
The general picture is preserved when calibrating the model to a similar increase of trade in R&D-intensive goods in a country of much larger dimensions. Table 2 reports the corresponding calibration results, which show that neither the terms of trade not the real exchange rate exhibit strong movements. Even under large trade costs, the terms of trade barely increase by more than a tenth of a percent, and the real exchange rate increases by less than 1.5 percent. 34 At the same time, the sizable net exports are of the same order of magnitude as those reported in Table 1 . 35 
Conclusion
This paper has proposed a novel mechanism by which global imbalances arise. It has shown that countries with a comparative advantage in a sector that is characterized by fast growth and large up-front R&D costs can experience substantial capital inows and outows. These capital ows (and the trade decits and surpluses that accompany them) occur under relatively stable terms of trade and real exchange rates. Additionally, given that trade costs are moderate, the cross-country differences in savings rates and income growth -variables that are usually cited to explain and rationalize global imbalances -are negligible. The dynamics of Swiss net exports and the increased share of pharmaceutical products in the Swiss export basket are argued to exemplify the mechanism described by the theory. A calibration exercise for the increase in pharmaceutical trade matches the increase in Switzerland's net exports reasonably well. NE 10 / GDP 10 -7.192 -3.140 -6.716 -3.018 -11.429 -5.319 -10.376 -5 Note: the equations deteriming the equilibrium are (21), (22), (26) and (27) . In all specification,, λ =114 according to the Swiss economic size and α C =1. Ω is chosen so that the share of D-exports is 27.6 in period t=1. τ =1.74 τ =1.74 
